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Plaintiffs’ Opposition leaves no question that the Amended Complaint should be 
dismissed with prejudice.  First, despite Plaintiffs’ best efforts to artfully plead and argue around 
Section 230, they cannot evade the statute’s broad grant of immunity.  To the contrary, Plaintiffs’ 
claims do—and as a matter of law must—treat Twitter as the “publisher” of third-party content 
allegedly transmitted via Twitter’s platform, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  Second, 
Plaintiffs cannot state a claim under the federal Terrorism Civil Remedy provision.  Indeed, even 
under Plaintiffs’ preferred test of proximate causation, they have not plausibly alleged that they 
were injured “by reason of” Twitter’s conduct.  Nor, moreover, does that alleged conduct meet 
the statutory definition of “an act of international terrorism.”  18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).  Under any 
fair reading, Twitter’s operation of its platform for freedom of expression does not “appear to be 
intended” to achieve a terrorism purpose.  Id. § 2331(1)(B).  Because Plaintiffs have already 
amended their pleadings, and because, in any event, these deficiencies cannot be cured by further 
amendment, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 
I. Section 230 Mandates Dismissal Of Plaintiffs’ Claims   
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Twitter is a provider of “an interactive computer service,” or 
that the ISIS-related content highlighted in nearly every paragraph of the Amended Complaint 
was “provided by another information content provider,” and not by Twitter.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1).  Yet Plaintiffs contend that Section 230 is no obstacle here because their claims do 
not treat Twitter as the “publisher or speaker” of that content.  Id.  In particular, Plaintiffs 
maintain that their lawsuit does not seek to hold Twitter liable for harm allegedly arising from 
any third-party messages posted to Twitter’s platform, or for injuries allegedly stemming from 
any of Twitter’s editorial decisions with respect to such content.  Instead, they say, their claims 
seek to hold Twitter liable on the grounds that Twitter (1) “knowingly permitted ISIS to sign up 
for accounts” and (2) “permitted ISIS to use” Twitter’s direct-messaging tool, thereby allowing 
ISIS to “send private communications outside the scope” of Section 230.  Opp. at 1-3.  Neither 
argument is defensible. 
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A. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Based On Content Created By Third-Party Users And 
Twitter’s Alleged Publishing Conduct With Respect To That Content  
 Plaintiffs insist (at 3) that their claims arise solely from Twitter’s “provision of Twitter 
accounts to ISIS,” and have nothing to do with third-party content or any “‘publishing’ decisions 
attributable to Twitter.”  That is false.   
 It is clear on the face of the Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs’ claims rely heavily on 
ISIS-related user content and Twitter’s alleged handling of that content.  In the very first 
paragraph, Plaintiffs summarize their suit by alleging that Twitter “has been instrumental to the 
rise of ISIS” by “knowingly permit[ting]” the terrorist group to use Twitter’s platform “for 
spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and attracting new recruits.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 1 
(emphasis added).  Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention (at 4) that “the Amended Complaint focuses 
on Defendant’s provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS, not the contents of Tweets,” the remaining 
93 paragraphs are likewise riddled with descriptions of messages, images, and videos allegedly 
created by ISIS, as well as accounts of harm allegedly caused by that content.  See id. ¶¶ 19-29 
(“ISIS Uses Twitter to Recruit New Terrorists”); ¶¶ 30-34 (“ISIS Uses Twitter to Fund 
Terrorism”); ¶¶ 35-47 (“ISIS Uses Twitter to Spread Its Propaganda”); see also ¶¶ 49-56, 62, 84.   
 Even the few allegations in the Amended Complaint that reference Twitter accounts used 
by ISIS—which Plaintiffs now feature prominently (at 4-5) in arguing that their lawsuit is 
actually about the provision of Twitter accounts rather than third-party content—quickly turn to 
the ISIS-related messages allegedly disseminated from those accounts.  E.g., ¶ 3 (ISIS media 
wing “maintained a dedicated Twitter page where it posted messages from ISIS leadership as 
well as videos and images of beheadings”); ¶ 4 (ISIS public relations group “maintained at least 
a half dozen accounts, emphasizing the recruitment of Westerners”); ¶ 20 (“ISIS reaches 
potential recruits by maintaining accounts on Twitter”); ¶ 69 (describing account that tweeted 
during the aftermath of the attack in San Bernardino: “California, we have already arrived with 
our soldiers . . . .”).  What is more, the Amended Complaint repeatedly faults Twitter for its 
alleged exercise of (or failure to exercise) a publisher’s traditional editorial functions with 
respect to such third-party content, asserting that Twitter is liable for the attack that killed Mr. 
Fields and Mr. Creach because Twitter “knowingly permitted” ISIS to transmit extremist 
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material through Twitter’s platform, and failed to “actively monitor” users’ speech, adequately 
“censor user content,” and appropriately “shut down clear incitements to violence.”  Am. Compl. 
¶¶ 1, 60, 66.  This is precisely what Section 230 prohibits.  See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1171-1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“review[ing]” and 
deciding whether to “remove” third-party content is “precisely the kind of  activity for which 
Congress intended to grant absolution with the passage of [S]ection 230”).    
 The Amended Complaint’s content-based allegations are no accident and cannot be cured 
by further amendment.  However Plaintiffs attempt to recast their theory of liability—now 
framed as predicated on Twitter’s alleged provision of accounts to ISIS—the ISIS-related 
content assertedly transmitted via Twitter’s platform, as well as Twitter’s alleged publishing 
decisions in relation to that content, remain essential components of Plaintiffs’ claims.  
First, under the Terrorism Civil Remedy provision, Plaintiffs must establish that Twitter 
proximately caused the deaths of Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach before Twitter may be held liable 
for Plaintiffs’ injuries.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate injury “by 
reason of an act of international terrorism” (emphasis added)).  Plaintiffs’ own brief reveals that 
the ISIS-related content allegedly transmitted via Twitter’s platform is crucial to that effort, no 
matter what standard of proximate causation is applied.  Attempting to satisfy their favored 
“substantial factor” test, Plaintiffs point out that they allege that “Twitter has permitted ISIS to 
use its social network ‘as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and attracting 
new recruits.’”  Opp. at 15 (quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 1) (emphasis added).  They also note that, 
according to the Amended Complaint, Twitter “gave ISIS access to its Direct Messaging 
capabilities which it used for ‘covert signaling’ as well as ‘fundraising and operational 
purposes.’”  Id. (quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 21) (emphasis added); see also Mot. at 22 (outlining 
Amended Complaint’s protracted chain of causation, which relies at every turn on ISIS-related 
user content and Twitter’s alleged handling of that content).  Such allegations—and argument—
are no surprise.  Without them, there is no connection at all, not even a distant and speculative 
one, between Twitter’s alleged conduct and the “lone wolf” attack that took the lives of Mr. 
Fields and Mr. Creach.  Indeed, if, as Plaintiffs now insist (at 3), their claims are premised 
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 32   Filed 05/25/16   Page 7 of 21
  
Case No. 3:16-cv-00213-WHO 4 
 
Defendant Twitter’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ 
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
merely on the allegation that Twitter has “permit[ted] ISIS to sign up for accounts,” and not on 
any allegation that ISIS has used those accounts to transmit messages aimed at recruiting new 
members, raising funds, or spreading its extremist agenda, Plaintiffs can hardly claim that 
Twitter “has been instrumental to the rise of ISIS,” Am. Compl. ¶ 1; accord Opp. at 1—much 
less that Twitter proximately caused the tragic attack at issue here.   
Second, the same is true of Plaintiffs’ effort to plausibly demonstrate, as they must, that 
Twitter “knowingly permitted ISIS to sign up for accounts.” Opp. at 1 (emphasis added); 18 
U.S.C. § 2339A (defining offense as providing material support “knowing or intending” that it 
be used for terrorism purposes); id.§ 2339B (proscribing “knowingly provid[ing] material 
support . . . to a foreign terrorist organization”).  After all, unless Plaintiffs seek to impose a duty 
on all computer service providers to carry out a thorough background check on every would-be 
user before allowing him or her to sign up for an account—the logical but unworkable upshot of 
Plaintiffs’ theory—user content is generally the only means by which service providers like 
Twitter can even begin to “know” who their users are.  The Amended Complaint proves as 
much.  Attempting to support the claim that Twitter has “Knowingly Permit[ted] ISIS to Use Its 
Social Network,” Am. Compl. at 9, the Amended Complaint alleges that terrorism experts and 
the media have reported on ISIS’s use of Twitter to “brag[] about recent attacks,” “recruit 
individuals, fundraise and distribute propaganda,” display “posters” with extremist messages, 
and show “graphic video” of terrorist acts, id. ¶¶ 49-56.  Even more revealing is the solution 
proposed by the Amended Complaint to the alleged problem of ISIS using Twitter’s platform to 
advance its agenda: “Twitter could and should” try to stop ISIS, Plaintiffs assert, by deploying a 
content-based algorithm, like that used to track child pornography, that “could be applied to 
terror content.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 67 (emphasis added).1   
                                                 
1 Of course, Section 230 applies whether or not Twitter knew of any objectionable user or 
content.  See Mot. at 14 (because “notice-based liability ‘would defeat the dual purposes 
advanced by § 230 of the CDA,’” Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997), the 
statute’s protections “apply ‘even after notice of the potentially unlawful nature of the third-party 
content,’” Universal Comm’n Sys. v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
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In short, in order for Plaintiffs to have any shot at satisfying the basic pleading 
requirements of either the material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A & 2339B, or the 
Terrorism Civil Remedy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), their theory of liability must as a matter 
of law depend on ISIS-related user content and Twitter’s alleged publishing role with respect to 
it.  See Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096, 1101-1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that however a 
plaintiff styles her cause of action, “what matters [in Section 230 analysis] is whether the cause 
of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of 
content provided by another”). 
In any event, even if Plaintiffs could somehow satisfy their pleading requirements relying 
only on their revised, account-provision theory of liability, Section 230 would still mandate 
dismissal.  As courts have repeatedly recognized, “decisions regarding the ‘construct and 
operation’ of a defendant’s website[],” are “no less publisher choices” than the decision whether 
to withdraw or alter content.  Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, 20-21 (1st Cir. 
2016) (quoting Universal Comm’n Sys. v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007)).  Most 
recently, in Backpage, the plaintiffs “insist[ed] that their allegations d[id] not treat Backpage as a 
publisher or speaker of third-party content,” but instead sought to hold Backpage liable under the 
civil remedy provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) for 
its “acceptance of anonymous payments,” “lack of controls on the display of phone numbers,” 
and “option to anonymize e-mail addresses.”  Backpage, 817 F.3d at 20.  The First Circuit 
rejected those contentions, reaffirming that the “language of [S]ection 230(c)(1) extends to the 
formulation of precisely the[se] sort[s] of website policies and practices.”  Id.  As the court 
explained, a service provider’s decision to grant users “the option to anonymize e-mail 
addresses,” id., or “accept[] anonymous payments,” id., or “register[] under multiple screen 
names,” Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420, “reflect choices about what content can appear on the website,” 
Backpage, 817 F.3d at 21.   
The same is true here.  Although Twitter does sometimes block accounts or remove 
content when enforcing its rules, see, Am. Compl. ¶ 69 (noting that Twitter “shuts down [] ISIS-
linked account[s]”); id. ¶ 70 (describing Twitter’s prohibition on “threats of violence” and 
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“promoting terrorism”), Twitter was established as a platform to facilitate “the freedom of 
expression [of] hundreds of millions of people around the world” (id. ¶ 65), and as such it opens 
its service to virtually all comers.  This decision to allow essentially anyone to “sign up for [an] 
account[] on its social network,” Opp. at 3, reflects Twitter’s decision about which voices may 
be heard, and so “what content can appear,” on its platform, Backpage, 817 F.3d at 21.  Thus, 
“even  if we assume, for argument’s sake, that [Twitter’s] conduct amounts to” material support 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A & 2339B, Plaintiffs’ claims “premise that [support] on [Twitter’s] 
actions as a publisher or speaker of third-party content.”  Backpage, 817 F.3d at 21 (rejecting 
plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims as based on Backpage’s role as a publisher).  “The strictures of 
[S]ection 230(c) foreclose such suits.”  Id.2   
                                                 
2 Neither Barnes nor the retracted opinion in Internet Brands is to the contrary.  The 
Barnes case “had a special fact, and the special fact was [that] one of the employees of the 
provider made a promise” to remove explicit photographs from the provider’s website.  Opp. at 6 
n.2 (quoting Jane Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Unofficial Oral Argument Tr. at 21:10-23:24 
(Apr. 8, 2015)).  As the First Circuit explained in Backpage, Ms. Barnes’s promissory estoppel 
claim therefore “did not attempt to treat Yahoo as the publisher or speaker of the photograph’s 
content but, instead, the claim sought to hold Yahoo liable for its ‘manifest intention to be legally 
obligated to do something.’”  Backpage, 817 F.3d at 22 (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107); see 
also Opp. at 6 n.2 (quoting Internet Brands oral argument) (noting that the employee’s promise 
was “not part of [] publishing”).  “No comparable promise [was] alleged” in Backpage, 817 F.3d 
at 22—nor has anything similar been asserted here.   
Internet Brands, in which the defendant prevailed in the district court and for which there 
is no operative appellate decision as of this Reply, has many distinctions from the present case.  
There the plaintiff, who had posted a profile on defendant’s website, alleged that the defendant 
had breached a common law duty to warn her of an ongoing scheme in which two men targeted 
users of the website to rape them.  Notably, however, the perpetrators never themselves posted 
any information on the website.  Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, 767 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 
2014), reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 778 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2015).  Even if the Ninth 
Circuit were to reject immunity in that case, its decision likely would focus on both the absence 
of any “allegation that [the website] transmitted any potentially harmful messages between” the 
plaintiff and the two men, as well as a theory that, in those unusual circumstances, imposition of 
a duty to warn would merely require a defendant to speak on its own behalf and would not 
require it to regulate content created by others.  Id. at 897-899.  The “strange fact pattern” of the 
case appears to have caused the panel on rehearing to be “less worried about opening the flood 
gates.”  Opp. at 6 n.2 (quoting Judge Cogan during Internet Brands oral argument).  The same 
cannot be said here, where Plaintiffs’ claims—now recast to rely on the kind of open sign-up 
policy shared by every major Internet service provider—would do exactly that.   
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B. Section 230 Applies With Equal Force To Third-Party Content Privately 
Transmitted Through Service-Provider Platforms 
Equally unconvincing is Plaintiffs’ second theory for evading Section 230.  According to 
Plaintiffs, Twitter may be held liable for the deaths of Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach because it 
“provided ISIS with Direct Message capabilities.”  Opp. at 9.  Abandoning all pretense of not 
relying on third-party content sent through Twitter’s platform, Plaintiffs argue that because direct 
messages are private communications, they “are not published,” Opp. at 2, and so a theory of 
liability premised on their contents “does not seek to treat [Twitter] as a publisher or speaker,” 
Opp. at 9.  Plaintiffs are wrong.  This argument not only defies common sense—because, at least 
in the prototypical case implicating Section 230, private communications are at once less likely 
to cause harm and virtually impossible for a service provider to police—it is also foreclosed by 
the text of Section 230. 
As Plaintiffs acknowledge, Congress established Section 230’s protections “to respond to 
a New York state court decision, Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Company, 1995 WL 
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), which held that an internet service provider could be 
liable for defamation.”  Opp. at 8 n.3 (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101).  Recognizing that such 
liability “would have an obvious chilling effect,” Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th 
Cir. 1997), Congress responded by immunizing service providers against lawsuits seeking to 
hold them liable as a “publisher or speaker” of third-party content, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) 
(emphasis added); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.  In light of this background, both the Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits have recognized that “the term[] ‘publisher’ [in Section 230]. . . derive[s] [its] 
legal significance from the context of defamation law.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332; accord Barnes, 
570 F.3d at 1104.  And in defamation law, where “[o]ne of the elements of the tort of defamation 
is ‘publication’ of the defamatory matter,” it “simply means ‘communication intentionally or by 
a negligent act to one other than the person defamed.’”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577(1) (1965) (emphasis added)); see also Prosser & Keaton on 
Torts § 113, at 798 (“There may be publication to any third person.”).   
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To be sure, Congress chose not to limit Section 230 to the defamation context.  See 
Barnes, 570 F. 3d at 1104; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.  Under the statute, a publisher is likewise 
“one who ‘reviews material submitted for publication, perhaps edits it for style or technical 
fluency, and then decides whether to publish it,’” Opp. at 4 (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102), 
as well as one who “disseminat[es] information to the public” at large, Opp. at 10; see Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 332.  Plainly, however, the term also retains its original meaning:  Section 230 
“precludes courts from treating internet service providers as publishers” as that term is 
understood “for purposes of defamation,” Barnes 570 F.3d at 1104—that is, as one who 
communicates to “any third person,” Prosser & Keaton § 113, at 798 (emphasis added).3   
 Lest there be any doubt, the logical consequences of Plaintiffs’ theory evidence its 
implausibility.  If Plaintiffs were right that Section 230 did not bar lawsuits premised on the 
contents of private online communications, then any networking website with a messaging 
tool—indeed, any email provider—could be held liable for any harmful message sent through 
that component of its platform.  Google could be sued for a defamatory statement sent via Gmail, 
Facebook for a threatening note transmitted through WhatsApp, or LinkedIn for a discriminatory 
job description delivered through its messaging tool.  In this vast realm of online communication, 
interactive service providers would be subject to endless lawsuits and staggering liability.  
Plaintiffs’ construction of Section 230, in other words, would not simply chill online expression 
contrary to Congress’s clear intent.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).  It would threaten providers of 
email service and other online-messaging tools with crippling liability.4   
                                                 
3 Critically, in electing to define “publisher” broadly, Congress did not leave parties 
allegedly harmed by a service provider’s publication of user-generated content without recourse:  
“[T]hey may sue the third-party user who generated the content,” just “not the interactive 
computer service that enabled [the third-party] to publish the content online.”  Doe v. Myspace, 
528 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2008).  Section 230 thus reflects Congress’s policy choice “not to 
deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies 
that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 
330-331. 
4 Plaintiffs cite no authority for their proposed private-communications loophole, and we 
are aware of none.  Unsurprisingly, where courts have considered claims against online service 
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C. Allowing This Case To Proceed Would Give Rise To Precisely The Harms 
Section 230 Was Enacted To Prevent  
Lastly, and relatedly, Plaintiffs’ contention (at 11) that their claims would further the 
policy goals of Section 230 turns the statute on its head.  Plaintiffs’ theories of liability would 
eviscerate the law’s protections and bring about precisely the problems Congress sought to avoid 
in establishing Section 230 immunity. 
Under Plaintiffs’ account-provision theory, liability would attach “the moment [a service 
provider] permitted [a terrorist or defamer or fraudster] to create an account,” Opp. at 4 
(emphasis added), leaving service providers little choice but to exhaustively evaluate every 
would-be user before allowing him to sign up for service.  Even ignoring the question whether 
any major Internet service provider would continue to operate under such conditions, this 
extraordinary “burden would become the public’s burden.”  Smith v. People of the State of 
California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (invalidating strict liability anti-obscenity ordinance).  The 
resulting “self-censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting the whole 
public,” and through it, all online expression, “both [unprotected] and [protected], would be 
impeded.”  Id. at 154.   
That Plaintiffs’ theory would impose liability only if a service provider knowingly 
allowed a terrorist to sign up for service is no answer.  For one thing, the question whether a 
service provider knew of the danger posed by a particular would-be user at the time he signed up 
for an account is a question of fact, so service providers would often be subjected to the 
burdensome process of discovery, even if not to ultimate liability.  For another, imposing 
liability based on a service provider’s knowledge—whether with respect to a particular user or 
                                                                                                                                                             
providers premised on e-mail communications, they have not hesitated to reject them under 
Section 230.  See, e.g., Hung Tan Phan v. Lang Van Pham, 182 Cal. App. 4th 323, 324, 328 
(2010) (Section 230 bars liability for republishing “defamatory e-mail over the internet” absent 
“material contribution”); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513-514, 529 (2006) (Section 230 
bars distributor liability for both service providers and users accused of republishing “defamatory 
statements in e-mails”); Beyond Sys. v. Keynetics, 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536-537 (D. Md. 2006) 
(rejecting on Section 230 grounds claim against service provider based on “allegedly offensive e-
mails that were sent” via provider’s platform). 
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user content—would undermine Congress’s second aim of eliminating disincentives for service 
providers to self-police their platforms.  See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 
2003).  Notice-based liability would “motivate providers to insulate themselves from receiving 
complaints” and  “discourage active monitoring of Internet postings.”  Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 
P.3d 510, 525 (Cal. 2006); accord Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420.    
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ alternative theory—that service providers may be held liable for 
harms arising from any third-party content transmitted privately through their platforms—fares 
no better.  Because such speech is virtually impossible for a platform-provider to police, service 
providers might well choose to protect themselves from liability on this front by altogether 
ceasing to offer private messaging applications.  Plaintiffs’ theory could do more than just chill 
private online speech, then, it could eliminate it altogether.  
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion (at 11-12), courts have repeatedly recognized that 
application of the material support statutes very much can “implicate [the] free speech concerns”  
that animate Section 230.  For example, although the Supreme Court in Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (“HLP”) upheld 18 U.S.C. § 2339B under the First Amendment 
“as applied to the particular activities” the plaintiffs wished to pursue, id. at 8, it did so only after 
applying strict scrutiny in light of the important speech interests at stake, id. at 27-28 (rejecting 
government’s request for intermediate scrutiny because “§ 2339B regulates speech on the basis 
of its content”).  And the Ninth Circuit, noting these interests and the manner in which the 
Supreme Court “carefully circumscribed its analysis in HLP,” has “hesit[ated] to apply that 
decision to facts far beyond those at issue in that case.”  Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 1001 (9th Cir. 2011).  Indeed, Congress issued a similar 
warning in Section 2339B itself, advising that the material support statutes should be carefully 
construed to safeguard “the exercise of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.”  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i).  But Plaintiffs ignore these many 
admonitions, and ask this Court to do the same. 
 Nor is there any conflict here between the Terrorism Civil Remedy provision and Section 
230.  Even assuming that Twitter’s opening of its platform for free speech to virtually all comers 
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could somehow give rise to a cause of action under that provision—and it cannot, see infra at 12-
15—Congress enacted Section 230 for the very purpose of barring a cause of action where one 
might otherwise lie.  Whether that cause of action is predicated on the common law, supra at 7 
(Congress enacted Section 230 in response to defamation case), a local ordinance, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(3) (prohibiting any cause of action under “any State or local law that is inconsistent 
with this section”), or a federal statute like the material support provisions, Roommates, 521 F.3d 
1157 (dismissing in part complaint alleging violations of federal Fair Housing Act on Section 
230 grounds); Backpage, 817 F.3d 12 (affirming dismissal of complaint alleging violations of 
TVPRA on Section 230 grounds), Section 230 mandates dismissal where a lawsuit seeks to hold 
a service provider liable for harm allegedly arising from third-party content. 
 Because such is the case here, and because Plaintiffs’ content-based allegations cannot be 
cured by further amendment, supra at 3-5, this Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint in 
its entirety with prejudice. 
II. Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim Under The Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision 
A. The Amended Complaint Fails To Plausibly Allege Proximate Cause 
Plaintiffs contend (at 13) that to establish proximate causation they need only plead and 
prove that Twitter’s “acts were a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation” and 
that Plaintiffs’ injuries were “reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence.”  
That argument is not only wrong, as it disregards the Terrorism Civil Remedy provision’s “by 
reason of” language; it is also no help to Plaintiffs, for their allegations fail to satisfy even their 
preferred “substantial factor/foreseeability” formulation.   
The Terrorism Civil Remedy provision is not the first time Congress used that statute’s 
“by reason of” language to describe a law’s causation requirement.  Congress first used the 
phrase in the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), then again in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) 
(1914), and yet again in the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1970).  Because Congress “used 
the same words,” we “assume it intended them to have the same meaning”—namely, that a 
plaintiff must show “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged.”  Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (discussing “by reason of” 
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in civil RICO context) (emphasis added); id. at 269 (“directness of relationship is [a] … 
requirement of Clayton Act causation”).  Knowing the “meaning that courts had already given” 
these words, id. at 268, Congress used them again in the Terrorism Civil Remedy provision.  
Plaintiffs therefore must satisfy the same “direct relationship requirement.”  Hemi Grp., LLC v. 
City of New York, N.Y., 559 U.S. 1, 10 (2010) (construing “by reason of” in civil RICO case). 
To be sure, in Rothstein v. UBS AG, the Second Circuit quoted both the direct-
relationship standard and Plaintiffs’ preferred test to describe the causation requirement of the 
Terrorism Civil Remedy provision.  See 708 F.3d 82, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2013).  But the difference 
between the two formulations was not at issue in Rothstein, as the allegations in that case 
satisfied neither standard.  See id. at 95-97.  And both Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 
precedent foreclose applying a “substantial factor/foreseeability” test under a statute—like the 
Terrorism Civil Remedy provision—that requires a litigant to demonstrate that her injury was 
caused “by reason of” the defendant’s conduct.  See Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 12 (rejecting 
“foreseeability” in favor of “direct relationship” requirement); Couch v. Cate, 379 F. App’x 560, 
565 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that Hemi Group endorses “direct relationship” test and rejects 
“foreseeab[ility]”); Mattel v. MGA Entm’t, 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 1024 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (same).   
 In any event, there is no need for this Court to decide which version of proximate cause 
to apply because the Amended Complaint’s allegations fail even Plaintiffs’ preferred test.  
Although courts applying the “substantial factor” standard have not required plaintiffs to “trace 
specific dollars to specific attacks,” Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 433 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013), they have readily dismissed claims under Rule 12(b)(6) where the connection 
between the plaintiff’s injury and the alleged material support is remote or attenuated, e.g., In re 
Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 (O’Neill v. Al Rajhi Bank), 714 F.3d 118, 123-124 (2d Cir. 
2013); Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 95-97.  That is surely the case here. 
 First, as Plaintiffs themselves concede (at 2), the material support allegedly provided to 
ISIS cannot have proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries unless “ISIS is responsible for” the 
attack that produced those injuries.  See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 330 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“If Hamas did not use its resources to carry out the attack in which plaintiffs 
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were injured, then defendant’s support in augmenting those resources could not have been a 
substantial factor in causing that attack.”).  But the Amended Complaint does not allege that ISIS 
planned the attack or recruited, armed, or funded the attacker.  And although ISIS allegedly 
claimed credit for the attack, even that statement describes Abu Zaid as a “lone wolf”—i.e., a 
terrorist who acted independently.  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 80, 81.  Moreover, courts have viewed such 
statements skeptically given the “perverse” incentives for terrorists to claim credit for attacks 
they do not commit.  Strauss, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 449; see also Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. 
Supp. 2d 542, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).  ISIS may arguably “bear[] some moral responsibility” for 
having inspired Abu Zaid, then, but inspiration alone is too weak a link to support Plaintiffs’ 
claims.  See Linde, 97 F. Supp. at 330.   
 Moreover, Plaintiffs are wrong that beyond tying ISIS to the attack, they need only 
“allege that [Twitter] provided material support to ISIS.”  Opp. at 2.  Rather, and at a minimum, 
they must plausibly allege that the material support in question was a “substantial factor” in 
causing the attack.  See Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 91.  Much like the elaborate chains of causation 
rejected in Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 95-97, and Al Rajhi Bank, 714 F.3d at 123-124, however, 
Plaintiffs’ theory of causation is far too speculative and attenuated to meet this requirement, see 
Mot. at 21-22 (detailing each speculative step in Plaintiffs’ theory).   
B. Plaintiffs Fail To Plausibly Allege An “Act of International Terrorism” By 
Twitter 
As Twitter’s motion explained, Plaintiffs also fail to state a claim under the Terrorism 
Civil Remedy provision because they allege no conduct by Twitter that “appear[s] to be 
intended” to achieve a terrorism purpose, 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(B), and so cannot establish that 
Twitter committed “an act of international terrorism,” id. § 2333(a).  See Mot. at 23-25.  
Plaintiffs contend (at 2) that the element of objective intent is irrelevant because conduct that 
violates the material support statutes is “per se [an] act[] of international terrorism.”  Although 
some district courts have adopted Plaintiffs’ preferred interpretation, the Seventh Circuit en banc 
court, among others, has applied the statute as written and thus required plaintiffs to satisfy the 
elements listed in the statutory definition of “international terrorism,” including the intent 
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element at issue here, see Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, 549 F.3d 
685, 690, 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Stansell v. BGP, 2011 WL 1296881, *9 (M.D. Fla. 
Mar. 31, 2011).5  Only the latter approach is faithful to the statute Congress enacted. 
Congress certainly could have provided a civil remedy for all injurious violations of the 
material support statutes.  Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (authorizing suit based on “anything forbidden in 
the antitrust laws”).  Instead, Congress elected to make a “violation of the criminal laws of the 
United States” just one element of the relevant test.  18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A).  In addition, 
Congress required that the defendant’s conduct “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human 
life,” id., that it “appear to be intended” to achieve at least one terrorism purpose, id. 
§ 2331(1)(B), and that it have an international nexus, id. § 2331(1)(C).  And Congress asked not 
whether the alleged “violation of the criminal laws” satisfies these elements, but whether the 
defendant’s “act” does so, id. § 2333(a) (emphasis added).  This language plainly limits civil 
liability under § 2333(a) to particular acts that meet every element of the statutory definition. 
Plaintiffs are incorrect, moreover, that their allegations demonstrate that Twitter’s alleged 
conduct appears to be intended to achieve a terrorism purpose.  See Opp. at 17-20.  Contrary to 
this case, in which Twitter’s platform was allegedly (and incidentally) made available to 
terrorists in the course of providing an undifferentiated service to millions of users, each of 
Plaintiffs’ authorities involve material support targeted specifically to a terrorist organization or 
state-sponsor of terrorism.  In Linde, for example, the defendant bank was held liable for, among 
other acts, knowingly wiring “martyr” payments to the families of suicide bombers, thereby 
providing an incentive for the bombers to carry out their attacks.  97 F. Supp. 3d at 329, 335; see 
                                                 
5 Plaintiffs cite dicta (at 17) from Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 
suggesting that the Seventh Circuit in Boim adopted Plaintiffs’ view of the statute.  673 F.3d 50, 
68-69 (2d Cir. 2012).  That is incorrect.  The Boim en banc court separately evaluated whether 
the specific conduct in that case was “dangerous to human life,” 549 F.3d at 690, and 
“appear[ed] to [have] be[en] intended” to achieve a terrorism purpose, id. at 694.  And the court 
further explained that, whether or not a humanitarian group violates the material support statutes 
by knowingly “rendering [] medical assistance” to individual terrorists in the course of providing 
aid in a conflict zone, it would not be liable under the Terrorism Civil Remedy provision because 
such aid does not “appear to be intended” to achieve a terrorism purpose.  Id. at 699.   
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also Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 262-263 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (similar 
allegations).  In Abecassis v. Wyatt, defendants allegedly bypassed the U.N. Oil for Food 
Program in order to illegally funnel money to the Saddam Hussein regime, knowing that the 
money would be used to support terrorist activity in Israel (or willfully blinding themselves to 
that fact).  7 F. Supp. 3d 668, 673-674 (S.D. Tex. 2014).  And in Wultz v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 48-49 (D.D.C. 2010), the defendant bank allegedly executed dozens of 
wire transfers to accounts controlled by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), after being warned 
that those specific transfers were destined for the PIJ.  Each of these alleged acts was specifically 
directed to, and tailored to the particular needs of, the terrorist recipient. 
By contrast, Twitter’s alleged conduct closely resembles that of the aid organizations 
hypothesized in Boim to have provided generic and beneficial services to all comers.  See 549 
F.3d at 699.  By their nature, these services appeared intended to serve the public at large, not to 
promote terrorism.  Id.  It is no surprise that Plaintiffs ignore this distinction, for it is fatal to their 
claims: Twitter no more commits an “act of international terrorism” by running its platform for 
“freedom of expression for hundreds of millions of people,” Am. Compl. ¶ 65, than do such 
refugee organizations when providing their services. 
Because Twitter did not proximately cause Plaintiffs’ injuries or commit an act of 
international terrorism, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court’s “discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where,” as here, 
“plaintiff[s] ha[ve] previously amended the complaint.”  Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 
367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990).  Any further amendment, moreover, “would likely prove futile,” id. at 
374, as Plaintiffs can neither overcome Section 230’s protections nor state a plausible claim for 
relief under the Terrorism Civil Remedy provision.  See Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 
1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Futility alone can justify the denial of a motion to amend.”).  Especially 
because Section 230 “is an immunity statute” intended to protect entities like Twitter “not merely 
from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles,” Roommates, 
521 F.3d at 1174-1175, this Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice.    
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